CDD
CENTRO PARA DEMOCRACIA E DESENVOLVIMENTO

STRATEGIC PLAN

AGENDA 2025:
(With April 2022 addendums)

Building Resilient, Inclusive, Democratic and Rights Respecting Society

Maputo, December 2020

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Mozambique at the crossroads of economic breakthrough and failure

Mozambique experienced high growth levels during the last two decades until 2014 but has dropped to little less than the rate of population growth since then. There has been no major industrial transformation of Mozambique, and the rewards of the long period of growth have been unequally distributed. To aggravate matters, in recent years, Mozambique has faced a worsening security crisis in the resource rich region of Cabo Delgado where over 1,000 people have been killed and up to 300,000 displaced.[1] Growing inequality between an elite and young people feeling increasingly marginalized and with no future, at a time when some are set to become incredibly wealthy from mineral resources and corruption explains in part the roots of the complex conflict. Of concern is shrinking civic space best encapsulated by deaths of leading activists around election periods over the last five years.[2] Slowing growth and increased levels of debt are making the situation dicier.[3] This partly constitutes the myriad of paradoxes and contradictions that, during the last few years, have surfaced and turned into major inhibitors for further development of the natural resource-rich country.

In the same vein, evidence is emerging from research that economic expansion and successive organization of democratic elections without the emergence of complementary good leadership have resulted in many unintended consequences such as:

- High level public and private sector corruption with impunity;[4]
- Growth of unsustainable public debt;
- Increasing income, gender and geographical inequality;
- Social and political marginalization and exclusion among sections of Mozambicans, especially the youth;
- Sub-optimal management of natural resources
- Lack of trust in institutions of electoral governance.

It is against this background that CDD has developed this inaugural program strategy to tackle the underlying causes of inequality, poverty, and conflict by promoting voice and accountability, youth and women's rights, peace and security and economic justice. Our contribution in the next five years (2021-2025) will see us facilitating and catalysing change in collaboration with our allies and partners.

Relatedly, this strategy will be supported by funding plans, monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) framework to ensure quality programmes and results-based monitoring and learning.

This document has been updated, as of April 2022, from the original drafted in December 2020, to reflect changes in political, economic and social dynamics, and to reflect CDD's programmatic thinking (particularly in matters relating to peace and security) .

Contextual Analysis

CDD's contextual analysis focuses on the identification of salient issues, with implications to development, democratic governance, economic justice and women and youth rights in Mozambique and the continent at large. While CDD has ambitions of programming regionally, this inaugural program strategy will focus on establishing a strong national base which will be the spring board for regional and

[1] https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/mozambique-islamist-insurgency-regional-problem-cabo-delgado/
[2] http://osisa.org/supporting-justice-and-accountability-initiatives-for-the-family-of-late-anastacio-matavel/
[3] https://jubileedebt.org.uk/countries-in-crisis/mozambique-secret-loans-unjust-debts
[4] https://tradingeconomics.com/mozambique/corruption-rank

even global programming and influencing. Consequently, the majority of work will be national with a growing inclination towards regional level work as our experience grows. This is partly because of the nature of challenges the organisation will confront like the 'natural resource curse', and corruption, which often transcend borders in origin and solution. **In this regard, CDD sees itself, from the beginning, as an organisation with a grounded national presence yet developing a regional footprint.**

Democratic Governance Context Analysis

In 1962, a group of Mozambican 'nationalists' led by Eduardo Mondlane established a party called *Frente de Libertação Moçambique* (Frelimo) to liberate the country from the Portuguese rule. Following his death in 1969, and independence in 1975, Mozambique has had four successive national leaders: Samora Machel (1969-86), Joaquim Chissano (1986-2005), Armando Guebuza (2005-2015) and Felipe Nyusi (2015 to date). Since then, Frelimo has dominated the politics, economy and social structures of the country but the liberated party's historic commitments to building a just, equal and developmental society appear to have been abandoned. Successive leadership over the past 20 years have failed to bring the much-needed social and economic transformation in the country as seen from the country's sluggish progress in human development.

Using the human development index (HDI) as a measure of long-term progress in development (long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living), Mozambique has continuously ranked among the bottom 10 poorest countries in the world over the last two decades.[5]

Two decades of economic growth without transformation and inclusiveness

Over a period of 20 years, the national income of Mozambique measured in gross domestic growth (GDP) has risen from US$2.5billion in 1994 to US$17billion in 2014. The economy grew at an average of 8% annually, mainly from the export of coal and other mineral resources, investments in mega projects and receipts of foreign aid. As the economy grew, the national income per capita (measured in PPP) increased from US$260 in 1994 to US$1,093 in 2017. But only a few people share this income growth. Poverty is concentrated in the north (66%) and central (64%) provinces of the country compared to the south (19%). Apart from planting the seeds of social unrest and conflict, this geographical inequality feeds into a certain narrative in the country that state resources are unfairly distributed to favour specific areas where the ruling government gets electoral support. The social structures that pertain in Mozambique have ensured that women are less able to move out of poverty. They have less access to economic opportunities, decision-making and resources. For economic growth to support social cohesion, all segments of the population must be seen to participate and benefit in the wealth creation. The failure of successive governments to address geographical and income inequalities, and social marginalization and exclusion has led to conflicts, violence and fragile security in the country. Patronage politics perpetrated by the dominant ruling party seems to sustain a system of high-level corruption in the country. While dominant parties provided the anchor based on which the developmental state model was successfully implemented in South East Asia and a few African success stories, in Mozambique, the dominant party system has been used to facilitate high-level corruption. Since 1975, Frelimo has dominated the government and state apparatus

[5] http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MOZ

by entrenching its networks and personnel in the political and social structures of the country. Frelimo's entanglement with the state has become structural in nature, with senior party officials exploiting state power to access resources that serve their interests. The blatant proclamation of "it's our turn to eat" by erstwhile freedom fighters turns the dominant party state to being a 'risk' factor instead of an asset for national development. Patronage politics has affected how the ruling government either facilitates or hinders development of independent productive sectors of the economy over a period of time. It is not surprising that a key focus of this strategy will be deepening democracy by strengthening active citizenship; inclusion of formerly marginalised population groups; addressing corruption; and working on free and fair elections.

Lack of Social Cohesion due to social, political, and economic exclusion

Mozambique has a great diversity of people, culture, history and disparity in development across the north, central and south of the country. From 1977 to 1992, a civil war between Frelimo government and the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) caused about one million deaths and displaced about 5.7miliion people. With the signing of the peace accord in 1992, and subsequent introduction of multi-party democracy in 1994, there has been gradual weakening of the processes that allows people and government institutions to interact, consult, engage and exchange ideas in the country. Contested elections have eroded the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of many groups that feel that their political participation does not matter. Voter turnout at national level elections is one of the lowest in Africa as people begin to lose interest in national elections because they know the outcome will not make a difference.

Table 2: Voter turnout in national elections

	1999	2004	2009	2014
Presidential	69.5	36.42	55.86	48.64
Parliamentary	66.5	36.34	44.44	48.49

Source: Election Guide, 2018

Many CSOs perceive that there is a gradual closing of the civil society space in the country while the government also feels frustrated about civil society's constant criticisms without demonstrating to the government its potential value and contribution to matters of national interest. Private investments in the natural resources sector are creating many conflicts and further exacerbating social tensions in the country, as the wealth generated through the extractive industry does not seem to benefit all. The potential for extractives revenue is likely to worsen inequalities if top down development approaches are used, social injustice and exclusion could trigger renewed conflicts. The national economic development agenda will need to recognize these challenges and consider mainstreaming social cohesion into development programs to address some of the key factors that contribute to varied forms of exclusion in Mozambican society.

2022 Addendum:
The time remaining until the end of the current presidential mandate in 2024 will undeniably be turbulent, with little room for major political or economic change other than reforms that relate to the fight for succession. Any reforms that are implemented by the government will be for the empowerment of people in charge of the reforms, already with an eye on the next term. Such reforms are unlikely to be for the common good because they will not be the result of thoughtful studies but, instead, driven by the need to garner support for electoral purposes.

It is likely the government will make inconsistent, unsustainable, and even illegal decisions to satisfy its interests in the next 1-2 years, driven by groups that, in the context of approaching elections, wish to gain extreme relevance. For this reason, all government activities must be examined to avoid partners supporting electioneering and unsustainable initiatives. Likewise, it is important to be wary of reforms that allow the mobilization of funds necessary to finance political activities.

This impacts our thinking, and programmatic approach, in relation to democracy and human rights with the goal of ensuring **citizens' voices are shaping decision making processes and institutions are responsive, accountable and transparent.**

Violent Conflict in Mozambique and Africa

Since its independence from Portugal in 1975, Mozambique has alternated two long periods of war and peace: first, a 15 year-long civil war between the ruling party, the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo) and the rebel forces of the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo), which caused over one million deaths and displaced five million people. Since then, the signature of the Rome General Peace Accords in 1992, provided almost 20 years of peaceful transition to democracy and steady GDP growth, averaging 7% between 2003 and 2013.[6]

Crucially, the Mozambique's Institute for the Promotion of Peace—an association of former fighters from both sides in the 1981–92 war—remarked in March 2009 that Mozambique seems at peace but growing economic disparities and socio-economic injustice are weakening the peaceful transition.

Just when Mozambique was beginning to be regarded as a successful example of post-conflict peacebuilding, the resurgence of low-intensity armed conflict between Renamo and Frelimo in the period 2013–2016 provided an unexpected reality check, revealing the dangers of a flawed democratisation process.

To make matters worse, around March 2017, violent extremists went on a rampage in the northern province of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado with at least 2,500 people killed and nearly 700,000 internally displaced by this armed conflict.[7] Violent incidents involving the group, known locally as *Al Shabab*, have been increasing, with incessant attacks on civilians, government forces, and military installations. The group's activities have been concentrated on the coast of Cabo Delgado from Pemba city to the Tanzanian border. The government's response, however, has led to further human rights abuses. Government forces have detained journalists for covering events in Cabo Delgado and subjected civilians suspected of supporting the group to searches, looting, and arbitrary detention. The violence in Cabo Delgado has continued into 2021, causing insecurity and displacement within the province, and displacement to the neighbouring provinces of Niassa and Nampul.a

This strategy will set out to address the scourge of violence and attempt to analyse the risks and drivers of conflict in Mozambique and it will engage policy makers on how to build peace and security for Cabo Delgado and all Mozambicans.

[6] https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/conflict-prevention-mozambique
[7] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/04/what-next-insurgency-cabo-delgado

2022 Addendum:
The province of Cabo Delgado (CD) in Northern Mozambique has been the theatre of a violent and destructive conflict since 2017. The population has been caught in an escalating conflict between a violent extremist organisation (VEO) - who seek to secure channels for increased socio-economic benefits (through legal and illicit trade), religious participation, and inclusion in the governance of the territories they have influenced - and the government (with support from regional allies), that has sought to maintain its control in a province geographically, politically, and economically remote from the rest of the country. Both sides have engaged in atrocities, and the population has suffered greatly from the conflict, leading to over 800,000 internally displaced persons (IDP), mostly southward. The economy of the province has also suffered, thus undermining the already limited socio-economic opportunities available for the people of CD. Furthermore, the conflict has both regional and global dimensions. At the regional level, elements of the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) and Rwandan National Police (RNP) deployed to CD in July 2021, in support of the government. The deployment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) followed shortly afterwards. Tanzania, which shares an extremely porous border with CD, has also been a strong area of influence for the VEO, with some of its members Tanzanian nationals, as well as a number having tangible links to local communities across the border. The conflict has also been internationalised due to the presence of major multinational companies in the province, most notably due to the colossal LNG project on the coast of Afungi, and the pledge of allegiance of the VEO to the Islamic State (IS). The alleged links between the VEO and IS have prompted Western governments, most notably the US and the EU, to look for ways to intervene in the conflict to contain the threat of violent extremism in CD, identifying it with the global Salafi-Jihadi nebula. Finally, the conflict has garnered mainstream international attention following high-profile attacks by the VEO, in which foreign nationals were killed. International news outlets have thus contributed to internationalising the conflict and spreading their own narrative as to the nature, causes and consequences of the war.

From the beginning of the conflict there has been a focus on military operations to counter violent extremism. The government has broadly opted for a punitive approach to tackling the problem, with most international partners largely following suit. However, military progress since the deployment of the RDF and SAMIM has been significant, reversing VEO influence in the most conflict-affected districts of Palma and Mocimboa da Praia, with ongoing operations in Nangade and Macomia.

Despite military successes, the government has yet to implement any tangible responses that address the drivers of the conflict (weak governance at state and provincial level; poor economic conditions; actions by internal and external influencers to foment violence; and a series of critical mistakes made by state defence and security organisations). Nor has the government sought to address the root causes of violent extremism (political and social inequalities; extreme poverty; economic stagnation; poor government services; high unemployment; and individual financial incentives to fight). Therefore, the threat of a resurgence of violent extremism exists, particularly as the regional appetite and the available financial resources for a continuation of SAMIM are likely to wane by the latter half of 2022.
The government's coordination of humanitarian and development responses is through ADIN (Integrated Development Agency for the North) which has substantial money from the World Bank. Although it stresses a focus on youth employment and small business, it has no clear strategy. In September 2021, a $490m Reconstruction Plan for Cabo Delgado (PRCD, Plano de Reconstrução

de Cabo Delgado) was approved by the Council of Ministers. The money is divided as $190m for "quick win" projects in the first year and $300m in the next three years, but the status of progress is unclear. Furthermore, the World Bank, African Development Bank, UN and EU worked with a government team to develop the Resilience and Development Strategy for the North (ERDIN, Estratégia de Resiliência e Desenvolvimento para o Norte). Donors thought they had agreement of government on the draft in October 2021, but it seems Frelimo has issues with its contents[8].
Finally, the government has not yet sought to engage with local communities through structured dialogue to counter/prevent violent extremism by listening and acting on their politico, religious, and socio-economic grievances. However, a growing number of internationally funded P/CVE efforts are underway in some communities, but seemingly without an overarching strategy that is responsive to evolving conflict dynamics and national responses.

This impacts our thinking and programmatic planning, highlighting the need to **embrace multistakeholder, multi-format resolution dialogue to be core of a coherent Humanitarian, Development and Peacebuilding (HDP) Nexus strategy, including closely coordinated P/CVE initiatives.**

Mozambican Natural Resources Boom

Mozambique is on the brink of an important political-economic transformation. Starting in 2008, global mining companies made major coal finds in mineral-rich Tete Province. This was followed in 2010 by an even more significant development; natural gas reserves estimated at 150 tcf (the fourth largest in the world) were found in the Rovuma basin off Cabo Delgado Province in the north of the country. A large number of licences have been awarded to companies from the world over and they are now prospecting across Mozambique[9]. The potential of these finds and the ongoing search for further mineral wealth is staggering.
This momentous growth of the extractive industries is part of a wider process happening across much of sub-Saharan Africa, and in East Africa in particular. From the eastern DRC and Uganda to Kenya and Tanzania, several states across the region are experiencing dynamics similar to Mozambique's that will impact greatly on their economies, political life (including relations between the state and society) and international relations. In the case of Mozambique, this is deepened by the fact that its reserves, especially in the gas sector, are world-class and its revenues set to dwarf all non-extractives (EI) flows, including international development aid. The crucial matter raised by this resource boom is whether it can be placed at the service of broad-based development for the country as a whole as well as the regions where these resources are being extracted. When it comes to the impact of resource wealth in developing countries, it is an overstatement to speak of a "resource curse". Decision-makers presiding over cash-rich states have agency over policy and a number of experiences across the world show that revenues from the EI can be put to good use. However, the last four decades of EI development present a strong correlation between poor governance outcomes and weak states with limited capacity and political freedom. The experiences of Sub-Saharan African states in particular have been disappointing, with only Botswana making consistent use of its mineral revenues for poverty alleviation and institutional consolidation. The most prevalent outcome has been continuing poverty for the masses, even if small groups of insiders benefited significantly. These concerns are relevant to Mozambique's recent experience as

[8] Hanlon, MOZAMBIQUE 593 - Mozambique news reports & clippings –20 April 2022 *Why is Cabo Delgado a free-for-all?*
[9] http://www.inp-mz.com/

documented by a large number of observers:

1) The Mozambican public administration has modest capacity in the EI. This applies to all dimensions of the value chain verging from contract negotiation and the monitoring of company operations to the broader capacity to create jobs, diversify the economy and promote sustainable development.

2) Significant problems have emerged in dealing with populations of affected areas, especially in the context of resettlement, employment in the EI and related activities, and whether communities stand to benefit at all from EI development. This has resulted from both company and government actions. The displacement of populations will proceed in tandem with EI expansion and will likely grow exponentially in the years to come.

3) Political concerns have emerged about the quality of governance and the space for critical engagement with the government. As the government seeks to define a new rapport with the donors that mirrors its expected financial autonomy, it is distancing itself from traditional donor concerns and building relations with new partners. In this context, many development actors have expressed disquiet at the decline in their relationship with the government and the diminishing space for CSOs. A further dimension of this process is the elite's attempts to benefit from the boom through participation in the new EI economy. A robust natural resource governance program will be born out of this analysis and it will focus on improving state, civil society capacity to maximise revenues and other linkages from EI sector which respecting human rights of the marginalised.

2022 Addendum:
TotalEnergies is quietly moving to resume operations on the Afungi peninsula by the fourth quarter of 2022, although it remains cautious about the security situation in Cabo Delgado. The government and TotalEnergies agree that the market constraints created by Russia's invasion of Ukraine are creating additional pressure - and significant opportunities - to resume work to build two liquefied natural gas (LNG) trains in Afungi.

Although Total accepts there have been "significant improvements in the security situation," conditions are still not considered safe enough for the resumption of development.
However, with the districts of Palma and Mocímboa da Praia secured by a 2,500-strong Rwandan force, security concepts are being reevaluated in order to accommodate the new demand for energy created by the conflict in Ukraine. Rwanda will play a pivotal role in maintaining security in the area, but the return of the population is also key, since TotalEnergies wants to avoid any accusations of human rights violations involving those who were forced to leave the project site, or communities displaced by the war.[10]

As many parts of the world seek new sources of gas to ensure its energy security, the question remains: Can African markets fill the Russian gap, and what role can Mozambique play? This question, with global significance, will undoubtedly have an effect as to how Mozambique - with Frelimo's influence - manage LNG resources and opportunities in the coming years.

This, in turn, impacts our thinking and programmatic approach to **just and equitable distribution of resources, wealth and opportunities through advocating for more inclusive and sustainable economic development models.**

[10] https://zitamar.com/pressure-grows-mozambique-lng-restart-security-challenges-remain

National Debt Burden

Mozambique's economy has been struggling since the sovereign debt crisis that erupted in 2016, which was exacerbated by the consequences of climate disasters and a spectre called 'pre-source curse.'

The pre-source curse is driven by elevated leadership and societal expectations. These expectations can in turn drive suboptimal behaviour. For example, governments may be pressured by voters to embark on risky borrowing on the back of overly rosy projections. The expectation of an immediate windfall from gas revenues likely drove borrowing and reduced inhibitions of leaders. The discovery of Mozambique's 'hidden' state company debts of USD 2.2 billion was equivalent to 15 percent of the country's GDP. The state guaranteed these loans, thereby affecting public debt, which the Ministry of Finance authorised, but without a vote in parliament. IMF and donors withdraw support in protest. These events and the continued decrease in commodity prices forced the government to declare it was unable to service its debt at the end of 2016. Addressing the debt crisis will require actions from multiple players. Some creditors may need to postpone debt payments in view of Mozambique's precarious fiscal position jeopardized by COVID19 pandemic, Mozambique government must hold officials responsible to account and money acquired through corruption returned, civil society capacity to analyse and campaign on debt will need to increase and creditors will need to practice meaningful due diligence to prospective debtors. Finally, Mozambique government will need to improve domestic resource mobilization through modernizing tax systems and administration

2022 Addendum:

President Nyusi has recently been touring the world trying to raise upwards of $800m per year to address the conflict in CD, with the EU pledging to support SAMIM with EUR1.9m in financial assistance. International agencies are also fundraising for hundreds of millions of dollars for humanitarian and development assistance. The World Bank approved over $800m in development projects in 2021, with the IMF announcing in March 2022 that it had reached an agreement with Mozambique for the implementation of an Extended Fund Programme (EFP) until 2025, with a staff-level agreement on a $470m facility. This is the first time the IMF has funded Mozambique since the disclosure of the so-called hidden debt scandal in 2016, with only occasional financial aid following specific disasters, such as the Covid-19 pandemic and cyclones Kenneth and Idai, in 2019.

This impacts our thinking and programmatic planning related to **economic justice, particularly in relation to transparency and accountability in the use of financial resources during a politically charged period when temptations for increased corruption are considerable**.

Youthful Population, Gender Inequality

Mozambique has a population of about 30 million people out of which 65% are less than 25 years old, making it one of the highest youthful populations in the world. The potential for such a youthful population to provide demographic dividend is enormous if investments are made that put this population to productive use. However, youth participation in the economy and politics is marginalized. One in two Mozambican youth is unemployed. The African Union and development partners have raised concerns about the political and social consequences of excluding the youth

who constitute a majority of the population. The future of Mozambican youth is further put in jeopardy by the unsustainable increase of the public debt. Public debt reached an unsustainable crisis level of 112% of GDP in 2017. Not only will the youth be required to repay the debt but payment will also deprive them of the benefits of public sector investment in education and health that are needed for their development, not least demographic dividend. Yet there is little discussion on-going in Mozambique about how to engage the youth on policies and programmes that affect their future. African Heads of State and Government have devoted the year 2017 to "Harnessing the Demographic Dividend through Investments in Youth" but in Mozambique there is no clear pathway through which the government is seeking to harness this demographic dividend.

Gender Analysis

In 2009, the World Bank declared that in Africa, the face of poverty is women. Women in Africa are half of the population, but account for 70% of the poor. Yet 70% of Africa's own-grown food is produced by women who are 80% of Africa's farmers. African women have less control of land than women in other regions. Access to essential services on health care are still limited. According to a UN report, the total annual economic losses due to gender inequality in the labour market have averaged US$95 billion per year since 2010 in sub-Saharan Africa and could be as high as US$105 billion. Consequently, closing the gender gap would be a boon for Mozambique's economic and social prospects.

Gender inequalities and the disproportionate burden inequality imposes on women and girls across the continent continue to undermine Africa's development. Despite the growing attention on gender issues and gender equality, much is still left to be desired as wide disparities continue to exist between women and men. African women continue to face many forms of violence and discriminatory practices in realizing a full range of political, economic and social rights. For instance, there are wide variations in female labour force participation between and within countries in Africa. Available statistics show that labour force participation rates are lower for women than for men in every country. They still earn far less than men for comparable work. Economic and social policies are not only exacerbating inequality, but also entrenching discrimination against women and holding back their economic empowerment. Women and girls are specifically affected by societal norms around gender, which prevent them from realizing their full potential. Cultural traditions and unjust social structures limit their opportunities, restricting their access, to land, credit facilities among other essential services.

Strong political will is required to make concrete financial commitments towards achieving gender equality and holding African countries like Mozambique accountable to institutionalize resource and implement key national and regional standards and commitments at the national level. This will ensure the implementation and enforcement of African women's rights as guaranteed in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of women in Africa (Maputo Protocol), which speaks among others to: elimination of discrimination against women; women's right to education and training; women's health and reproductive rights; women's social and economic rights, and protection of women's right to participate in political and decision-making processes

Strategic shifts

CDD will significantly shift its way of delivering programmes and approach to being more **of a catalyst for change rather than the 'savior of the world'**. Our role will span advocacy, campaigns and influencing as we seek to engage the citizens of Mozambique and African states in an effort to see a country that is self-reliant, democratic, peaceful, and responsive to the rights and development needs of its citizens. To achieve this strategy, CDD will ensure rights-based and participatory programming in collaboration with partners and citizens leading their change while we provide facilitation towards ensuring change, ownership and sustainability.

We will develop partnerships to expand our influence and directly engage with institutions to focus on institutional reforms and effectiveness. This will include local coalitions, regional institutions, regional economic blocs, sub-regional institutions and development partners.

Given the changing architecture of development assistance in Mozambique, we'll engage with emerging powers (including Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa etc.) to influence their impact on Mozambique's development agenda and prioritize making political leaders effective and engaging them to strengthen governance mechanisms that promotes transformative leadership and accountability.

2022 Addendum:
Given the global economic impact from the war in Ukraine, and significant recent funding support from the World Bank, IMF and EU (as previously described), it is more likely that Mozambique - and CDD - will have to think carefully about engaging with emerging powers, as the choices made in the next three years are likely to have long-lasting impact on their futures.

We'll be cognizant when engaging with relevant stakeholders in our programming. For instance, with growing interest and brokering power of International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGOs) and foundations on African Union (AU) decisions, we'll work closely with them to influence decisions at the regional level, informing continental policy decisions.

We'll also prioritize strengthening our local partners' institutional capacity to ensure the sustainability of our programmes and interventions supported with a comprehensive and robust Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) strategy that will ensure programme effectiveness.

Strategic Pillars of our work

CDD will work at multiple levels including at the grassroots and with policy-makers, engaging directly with communities as well as decision makers to ensure that people living in poverty can improve their lives and livelihoods and have a say in decisions that affect them. Combining long-term development programming with catalytic, responsive and timely interventions, capitalizing on key moments and opportunities in the socio-political spectrum, CDD will employ a "one programme" approach, understanding that social, economic and political issues do not exist in isolation and that failures in governance manifest in social injustices and poverty. CDD will have four key programming pillars that are stand-alone yet interdependent and interrelated; **Democracy and Human Rights**, **Youth Leadership and Gender Justice, Economic Justice, and Peace and Security.**

1) Democracy and Human Rights

Program Goal: Citizens' voices are shaping de-

cision making processes and institutions are responsive, accountable and transparent

Problem statement

- Growing intolerance of dissent and closing of civil society space
- Rising levels of corruption (public and private), unnecessary secrecy within state institutions, securitization and consolidation of power through patronage
- Low levels of participation of young people and women in decision making processes
- Uneven electoral playing field; fair access to resources, media, and arbiters such as electoral commissions, court and law enforcement agencies.
- Unresponsive and unaccountable state and governance institutions

Program Outcomes (The change we seek)

- Governance institutions are more transparent, responsive, agile and accountable to the needs of citizens
- Civil organizations, media and social movements are coordinated, organized and capable of holding government and companies to account
- Ratification and implementation governance policies and principles enshrined in local and regional instruments on democracy, elections and governance
- Young women and men are empowered to act on their potential and are change agents in advocating and influencing for their social, economic and political rights
- Competitive political processes where young men and women participate without fear of victimization

Some strategies in this programme include;

- **Advocacy initiatives:** meetings with election management bodies on creating conducive environment for women and youth to participate in elections and to seek elective posts; Massive mobilization of young people and women to participate in elections and voters and candidates
- **Enhancing capacity of CSOs and youth networks on democratic principles and progressively ensuring monitoring of governments' implementation of policies and laws on democracy and peoples' engagement**
- **Research and development of empirical evidence on implementation of policies and laws on democratic principles in partnership with Human Rights Commissions, anti-corruption agencies, local and international universities, think tanks etc.**
- **Creating and strengthening citizens (including youth) engagement platforms and/ or spaces at national, regional and continental levels with political parties**
- **Convene Civil Society Organizations, political parties and private sector** at national and regional levels to take responsibility and engage, protect and promote their democratic spaces
- **Promote institutional reforms to improve accountability** and responsiveness to citizens and other stakeholders

2) **Youth Leadership and Gender Justice**

Program goal: Respect, protection, fulfilment, integration of women and young people's rights in the development agenda.

Problem Statement

- Pervasive negative norms, attitudes and beliefs towards women, girls and young people contribute to the economic and political marginalization of young people and women.
- A lack of capacity and cohesion to address the multi-dimensional nature of gender oppression, endemic and systemic gender-based violence.
- Political and economic marginalization of women and young people in decision making processes and economy
- Low participation of young people in competitive political processes
- Massive unemployment, disillusionment among people

Program Outcomes (The change we seek)

- More women and young people are appointed to key roles within political parties and extractive industries sector
- Laws, policies and regulations aimed at ending gender-based violence (GBV) and promoting access to sexual reproductive health and right (SRHR) are enacted and implemented
- Young people, women are participating in decision making in the socio-economic and political spaces and enhancing transformative leadership in Mozambique and Africa in general
- Young people, women land and property rights are secured and upheld through enactment and implementation of legislative, policy and institutional frameworks
- A movement of organized, resourced young people, women, with a strong feminist agenda, emerges to advance the empowerment & participation of young women in all spheres of society
- Capacity of public institutions and other stakeholders is strengthened to ensure that women and young people benefit equitably from large scale extractives, infrastructure and agricultural projects

Some strategies for the youth and gender injustices program

- **Movement/ coalition building**; Strengthen collaboration with youth and women's rights organizations to mobilize stakeholders to develop, allocate resources and implement Multi-Sectoral Approaches and frameworks for accelerating domestication of the instruments key to youth and women rights while challenging retrogressive cultural practices and believes. This will aim at mitigating the impacts of discriminatory health, education and economic empowerment, strengthening land rights for women and realizing agriculture and food security
- **We will seek to build collective power and create strategic champions and role models amongst those in positions of power and authority** (legislators, security sector representatives, etc.) recognizing that governance systems and institutional culture as well as the individuals within them must also change for gains to be sustained.
- **Youth and Women's participation and transformative leadership:** Our work will focus on building the capacity of youth and women and amplify their voices by facilitating their participation in all decision-making spaces at national and regional level in order to promote transformative leadership in decision-making, the economy and in society. This will entail working with university student leadership council, youth-based organizations, African Union Youth clubs etc. We will train and mentor them through Fellowships in which outstanding young people will go through intensive leadership training focusing on different themes while some will be placed in strategic institutions as interns or Junior fellows where they will be mentored by key influencers in countries
- **Public campaigns:** Mobilizing citizens to speak out on transformational women and youth leadership
- **Build the capacity of youth and women's rights organizations to engage in economic and or natural resources management, blue economy policy debates at national and regional level**; Strengthen, support and coordinate efforts among the various coalitions working on Youth and women's rights
- **Generate evidence on gender and youth gaps in macro-economic policies, youth demographics and unique vulnerabilities for selected areas**. This will inform our advocacy in challenging governments to increase investments in closing the inequality financing gaps. In the same vein, building relationships and networks with government, donors, private sector to

support youth and youth formations with seed capital in terms of technical capacity and start-up funds to realize their talents

- **Digital media engagement program** using mainstream and social media to popularize Youth Agenda in the country and amongst the decision makers
- **Advocate for implementation of SADC and AU's African Youth Agenda b**y national, regional and continental institutions towards achieving the African Agenda 2063

3) Economic Justice Program

Program Goal: Just and equitable distribution of resources, wealth and opportunities through advocating for more inclusive and sustainable economic development models

Problem Statement:

- Enclave economy-extractives are not meaningfully linked to the wider economy thus not many linkages
- Failing neo liberal macroeconomic model which has contributed in deepening historic inequalities
- Debt distress, illicit financial flows, low domestic resource mobilization
- Poor governance of public finances and bad resource governance (presource and resource curse)
- Exclusion from economy of many, high levels of youth and women unemployment
- As a result, the feminisation of poverty and inequality is pervasive. Women and girls are amongst the poorest of all demographic groups. They have the least access to formal employment and they remain largely in the informal sectors that are not supported or recognized in policy and practice
- A lack of equitable access to quality public services – especially in education and health – is fundamental to addressing inequality
- Massive involuntary resettlement of communities from productive land due to large scale agriculture and or extractives projects
- No systematic approach to leverage blue economy for economic development

Program Outcomes

Fiscal justice

• Governments develop fair (progressive taxation) and inclusive fiscal policies and strategies for revenue generation, management and utilization for the most vulnerable in society

• Budgeting and debt management processes become more transparent, sustainable, legal and spending on essential public services is prioritized

• Alternative development frameworks that are pro-poor and inclusive are developed-with special focus on understanding the dynamics, tenets of a democratic developmental state

• Governments and companies support the development and formalization of the informal business sector and small holder farmers

Natural resources and climate justice

• Rights of extractive industries affected communities in Africa are respected and protected and in particular, women and young people

• Greater transparency and accountability in extractive industries revenue flows using the EITI and frameworks

• Strengthening the positive linkages between extractive industries and socio-economic development in Africa using the Africa Mining Vision framework

• Governments and companies adopt and implement policies which leverage the blue economy as the engine of growth with potential of driving industrialization, alleviating poverty, increasing food security

• Governments and countries develop climate change compatible policies and they increase investments in renewable energy sources

Program strategies

- **Provide a platform for young people, women and communities/**citizens broadly to actively engage government and companies on the governance of extractive industries;
- **Monitor implementation of national, regional and global initiatives** like African Mining Vision, (AMV), Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI);
- **Develop a research agenda on the opportunities and challenges for a robust blue economy policy for Mozambique and beyond**. In the same vein, develop briefing papers on opportunities and political economy for renewable energy option for the country
- **Monitor the massive resettlement action plans currently underway on new mining, oil and gas projects e.g Maualadzi (coal), Palma, Pande Temane (gas**). CDD will ensure the resettlement processes are meaningfully consultative with affected communities and they adhere to international practice on resettlement like the World Bank Performance Standards
- **Policy research on domestic resource mobilization and curbing illicit financial flows** to strengthen national public finance reforms including tax systems
- **Campaign on pros and cons of double taxation agreements, bilateral investment treaties, tax incentives** that the government may sign as a way of enhancing foreign direct investment
- **Influence private sector, government to develop transparent and equitable local content models** and approaches that improve local capacity, create jobs for the young and curb capital flight.
- **Training legislators, government officials, revenue authorities, civil society and media on** how best to optimize utilization of the huge natural resources deposits through engaging summer/winter schools facilitated by world class Pan African academics in collaboration from international institutions in major investing countries (Samora Machel Fellowship on Natural Resource Governance)

4) Peace and Security (2022 Revision)
Program Goal: Governments and other stakeholders adopt and effectively implement mechanisms to ensure peace and security in Mozambique and the SADC region.

Problem Statement

- Protracted violent conflict, proxy wars, and inter-communal strife in resource rich province of Cabo Delgado in Mozambique. Such violence continues to accelerate structural poverty and processes of impoverishment in the country and have caused untold suffering among civilian populations, including deaths, sexual violence, displacement, shattered communities (physically and psychologically) and loss of hope for a decent standard of living.
- Proliferation of weapons, illicit trade and trafficking impacting a largely defenceless citizenry that has lost confidence in government, military and security forces.
- Massive poverty, socio-economic marginalisation and inequality in Cabo Delgado.
- Rise of intra-religious discord, the application of stricter religious ideologies and radicalisation of young people who feel excluded and ignored in development processes.
- Massive investment projects by Total Energies, Exxon and others delayed due to violence, with local supplier contracts cancelled, combined with the likelihood that a resumption of development will perpetuate violent competition (along with the impact of the assignment of additional concessions in 2022+).
- The impact of conflict in Mozambique is particularly severe on women and adolescent girls who are especially suscepti-

ble to sexual abuse, rape, recruitment by armed forces, trafficking, HIV/AIDS and other health complications. Such experiences have long term and devastating effects on their lives and those of their children.

Program Outcomes

- Policies and decisions on peace and security of the Government of Mozambique, and regional bodies such as SADC, are coherent, transparent, and proactive, and informed by the needs and aspirations of affected population in the country, focusing on the application of the *Humanitarian, Development and Peacebuilding (HDP) Nexus.*
- Government and the private sector are held accountable to their commitment to strengthen local leadership on peace, security, humanitarian actions, and social safeguards
- Policies and agreements on arms control, peacekeeping and security sector reform are effectively implemented.
- Northern Mozambique is secure and prosperous, and well-governed for its inhabitants; resumption of the development of strategic economic interests as a means of supporting further provincial growth, stability and improved public governance; drivers of violent extremism addressed and its spread averted.

Methodologies for the Peace and Security Program

- **Multistakeholder, multi-format dialogue that establishes a coherent path towards conflict resolution in Cabo Delgado**, to minimize violence on communities and foster sustainable peace through:

  - Developing and sharing strategic approaches and concepts that promote conflict resolution.

  - Harmonising stakeholder initiatives and ensuring conflict sensitivity.

  - Advancing the application of human rights and International Humanitarian Law.

  - Advising on foreign investment conformance with international standards.

- **Ensuring that the voices of communities who are at risk or affected by conflict and disasters are included and considered in dialogue in Mozambique**, regional mechanisms such as SADC and policy making at the African Union.

- **Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) through Community Engagement Activities (CEAs)** designed to build resilience at individual, community and political levels. CEAs will connect experienced community influencers with groups most at risk of radicalisation to nurture social and institutional change, build cohesion and reduce *push and pull factors* related to violent extremism.

- **Raising the prominence of protection and humanitarian issues** to impact government, private sector and donor agendaa, as well as their capacity to respond.

- **Investigative work and campaigning to stem the flow of illicit trade,** which fuels conflict in Mozambique.

- **Strengthening the capacity of local leadership on peace, security and humanitarian actions** to ensure they play an active role in support of conflict prevention and mitigation and peace building at different levels of society

- **Advocate towards silencing the guns** through changing community perception of drivers of peace and entrench positive citizens' roles.

- **Research and policy engagement on migration and displacement**: Exploring the nexus between conflict, insecurity and governance, and displacement and migration. Linking national, regional and advocacy on identified issues of migration; identifying the connection between climate change and climate-related migration and conflict, and contributing to global discourse and narratives on issues related to governance, migration, displacement and peace and security.
- **Working closely with the gender justice program and other women's rights organizations, particularly on issues pertaining to gender-based violence in conflict situations.**

Program Indicators of success

- Peace and security programs embrace the HDP Nexus with dialogue at its core, through multistakeholder participation and focused P/CVE initiatives.
- Peace and security processes are shaped by women ending sexual gender-based violence (SGBV) and all forms of violence of women and ensuring accountability.
- Peace and security programs improve the effectiveness of, and community confidence in, national military and security forces.
- Conflict financing is eliminated at all levels through the cessation of serious and organised crime, and effective and accountable resource governance and management resulting in protection of affected communities and prevention of conflicts.

Our pathway to change

Our programming on peace and security will focus more on tackling the drivers and root causes of conflicts in Mozambique and Africa in general. We will do this by strengthening local leadership, influence, catalyzing and supporting the adoption of progressive security and related policies at the national and regional levels, supported by decisions of the government, SADC and African Union.

Program focus places and stakeholders

- Northern Mozambique: Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Niassa (provincial government, communities, CSOs, private sector and security actors)
- National (executive and legislative elements of government, justice sector, CSOs, private sector, diplomatic community and multilateral organisations)

International partners and allies: International Committee of the Red Cross, UNHCR, Oxfam, UNOPS, IOM, Control Arm Coalition, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), International Crisis Group (ICG), Human Rights Watch and Diplomatic Missions, among others.

Target institutions and frameworks: Mozambique government, ADIN, AU Peace and Security Department, Political Affairs Department, SADC TROIKA, Diplomatic Missions, UN Special Representative; Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS); Crisis Action; Amnesty International, MHDRN


CDD Vision: A Resilient, Inclusive, Democratic and Rights Respecting Society
CDD
Outcomes
Democracy and Human Rights
Robust, well informed, organised, and active democracy where human rights are respected and protected
Youth Leadership and Gender Justice
Strengthen and support the voice, visibility and collective organising power of young people and women to advance gender justice and eradicate the systemic oppressions that impedes their lived freedom
Economic Justice
Just and equitable distribution of resources, wealth, and opportunities through advocating for more inclusive and sustainable economic growth and development models and supporting sustainable. Maximise the benefits from natural resources or broad-based economic transformation
Peace and Security
Governments and other stakeholders adopt and effectively implement mechanisms to ensure peace and security in Mozambique and SADC region
Strategies
Advocacy and organising
Public and private sector influencing
Connecting
Research
Partnerships
Positioning
Cross country learning
Assumptions
Legislative / policy reforms can improve governments & companies transparency & accountability
Informed, resourced CSOs, media, legislature are more likely to demand & get accountability from
Local, regional to global influencing promotes sustainable change
Women and youth as leaders and agents of change for sustainability
Informed, organized and free citizens are more likely to influence leaders
Project level focus for revenue accountability
Regional instruments are key leverage points for local change
Community Level Enabling Environment
Community Governance
Communities have easy access to information on opportuniti
Women and young people participate in decision making on issues that affect them
Communities can monitor corporate practice in their areas
Communities are engaged in decision making
Political
Duty bearers are representative and accountable to communities
Economic
Private sector engagement allows for space and receptiveness
Systems, policies and processes are in place
Technical
Functioning consultative grievance mechanisms in place between communities and companies
Communities are compensated for resettlement in fairly and equitably
Demands and Enables
National Level Enabling Environment
National Governance
Civic space exists
There is access to information on contracts, ownership, revenue payments, reporting
Political
Politicians and government bodies are representative of citizens
Human rights are upheld by laws and policies of governments and companies on
Economic
Governments have the capacity to generate, allocate and manage
Technical
NGO / media – capacity issues – oversight
Demands and Enables
Regional Level Enabling Environment
Regional Governance
Domestication of extractives regional instruments like the Africa Mining Vision
Regional frameworks in place to mitigate tax evasion, tax havens,
Coalitions of governments allow for synergy / power of collective unity
Political
Payment s and contracts disclosure legislation in place and upheld
Economic
Accountability of private sector / corporate
Technical
Connectedness of national NGOS – coalitions –
Barriers
Capacity gaps at multiple levels of the state to generate, manage and spend revenues
Asymmetries of power and information between companies and governments
Shrinking civic space, lack of citizen agency and knowledge
High levels of inequalities, violent conflict and internal displacement
Power and information asymmetry between multinational corporations and often poor African governments &
Lack of political will and endemic corruption
Systematic exclusion of women and youth in decisions which affect their lives
Shrinking, shifting civic space and lack of citizen agency
Context
Weak and outdated legislative framework
Secrecy in contracts
Revenue leakages and inequitable and unaccountable spending
Poor legislative control and oversight
Institutions not delivering inclusive development and essential services
Shrinking civic space
Increased environmental degradation
Exclusion of women and youth in decision making
Unfair and inequitable distribution of resources, poor regional economic development
Violation of human rights, endemic corruption involuntary displacement and resettlement
Poor compensation framework
Undeveloped linkages between mining and other economic and social activities

The change we want to see, the Mozambique we want:

We believe that change will happen when institutions are self-reliant, inclusive and responsive to the needs of citizens. Self-reliance here implies a developmental state that works in partnership with other stakeholders including development partners, private sector, civil society, citizens and other nations in a manner that is accountable, transparent, upholds democratic governance, protects and respects human rights, promotes equality and equity and ensures that no one is left behind in its quest to achieve sustainable development and peace in the country. This we believe will result in shared prosperity, inclusive growth and people cantered sustainable development driven by Mozambique's transformation agenda and achieving a better world for all.

Our theory of change is based on the following assumptions

a. *Strong tax administrations and sound public financial management* will help maximize the domestic resources that are necessary for government to function, to sustain social safety nets, to maintain long-term fiscal sustainability, and to free up fiscal space for pursuing socio-economic objectives

b. *Legislative / policy reform translates to increased citizen benefit*-CDD believes that just government policies and corporate practices lead to better outcomes for citizens. Coupled with this is the assertion that it is the right of communities to participate meaningfully in transparent decisions on issues that affect them

a. *Empowering communities and citizen capacity building*-Empowered communities as well as reformed policies on community consent (implemented by governments, companies and donors), can protect their lands, natural resources and livelihoods. CDD believes that information about developmental projects (e.g. extractives), their fiscal regimes, revenues and expenditure, must be disclosed in easily accessible and understandable ways. With this information in hand, citizens, CSOs and other entities can check corruption and channel more money to important social services such as education, health and support for agricultural livelihoods.

b. *Women and youth as agents of change for sustainability*-Achieving gender justice is a central component of our change process: we can't make progress in addressing human rights in different sectors without tackling directly gender bias and discrimination against women in the sector, both of which result in the negative impacts on women and their marginalization from decision-making processes. Youth movements are particularly important social actors for promoting reform.

c. *Access to information and disclosure of revenue, payment, contract details*-CDD recognizes that disclosure of basic information about projects (payments, contracts, environmental impacts, amongst others) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for improved management of these valuable resources. Citizens must have informed knowledge about these projects, the revenues they generate and the impacts they produce in order to have a robust debate on their management and use. In addition, governments must allow for freedom of expression and association to enable citizens, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), journalists and others to use information for holding duty bearers and corporations to account.

d. *Regional and international instruments as key leverage points*-The passage of various international legislation have established new regional and global norms as well as promoted a snowball effect in other capital markets. Promotion of progressive regional and global instruments such as AMV, PWYP will be central to CDD work

e. *Private sector engagement* - Corporations are pivotal stakeholders for achieving change in human rights practices,

in particular those practices related to resettlement and the rights of women and indigenous people. To achieve this change, CDD asserts that companies must use comprehensive gender impact assessments to inform decision-making and mitigate potential violations of women's rights. They must submit themselves to independent oversight involving civil society. They must also establish effective grievance mechanisms based on international standards and fully disclose human rights impact assessments

f. *Inequality in its meanest form has deprived women and girls a chance to have a life of dignity*-Taking a Rights Based Approach to development ensures that right holders and duty bearers embrace the principles of universality and indivisibility of rights, Non-Discrimination and Equality, participation, rule of Law and Accountability. It is therefore imperative to reinforce the capacities of duty bearers to respect, protect and guarantee rights while addressing development complexities holistically, taking into consideration the connections between individuals and the systems of power or influence**.**

g. *Government leadership*- is effective, ensuring that all actors including the private sector and civil society are effectively coordinated to develop and implement context specific plans and strategies, harness resources, and galvanize support for a joint sector performance monitoring mechanism.

h. *Effective and collaborative partnerships*- All stakeholders across civil society, private sector and government work together through diverse types of partnership for sustained impact**.**

SWOT Analysis

Based on the consultations and discussions with major development partners and a cross section of opinion leaders in Mozambique, CDD can tease out the organization's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) in the implementation of its vision and mission. Below are some of the highlights that came from the consultation:

STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
• Organizational leadership: the founding executive director of CDD is knowledgeable and experienced person with a track record in the fight against corruption in Mozambique; • Profound analytical work, knowledge and understanding of the country's political economy; • Credibility in and trust from Mozambican society in general and youth, thanks to director's track record; • Goodwill from many development partners, resulting in a seed grant from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and Oxfam AGIR and OSISA; • Committed and competent staff and leadership; • Creative and innovative approach to engage with youth and society in general (ICT, digital communication, etc.); • Focus not only on thinking but also and doing; • Capacity to deploy a variety of strategies at multiple levels, enhanced capacity for influence,	• As a new CSO, CDD does not have an institutional track record to build on, knowledgeability and credibility highly personalized as of now; • Inadequate financial and human resources. • Limited asset base, investments for the new organization

OPPORTUNITIES

- CDD ideas of focusing on transformational leadership to complement institutional development resonates with many development partners and public intellectuals in Mozambique;
- There is no organization in the country currently nurturing leadership democratic and developmental change and social cohesion;
- On-going discussions among Mozambican elites on the need to develop a long-term national vision before the windfall gas money arrives; and
- Youth empowerment is a priority programme for the African Union as an entry point for the demographic dividend.
- Significant appetite for investment in Mozambique from BRICS and major Western countries which opens doors for increased profile of Mozambique governance systems and funding possibilities
- Rise of online activism in Mozambique which presents an opportunity for engagement. This is coupled by 'social fervent' where there is intense debate on multiple political and economic issues from debt to elections, devolution and poverty. This is in itself a useful condition for robust influencing
- Growing regional interest for Mozambique CSO partnerships
- Popular destination for regional convening and proximity to key regional players like South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe which makes travel and collaborations relatively easy
- Limited regional knowledge for Mozambique recent history, political and social dynamics amongst regional CSOs which presents an opportunity and gap (language limitations)
- Increased recognition of the need to hear voices from the ''Global South' in international platforms allows Mozambique and Africans to speak louder on issues that affects them

THREATS

- The Mozambican state is prone to "capture" by entrenched interest groups in and outside the ruling party. Such groups believe in 'entitlement' to state resource for being former liberation movement fighters. CDD mission will be considered antagonistic and a threat to their entitlements. CDD will need to find ways of neutralizing this group without being confrontational;
- Related to this, there is a risk of lack of support and followers (mainly among youth) due to fear of potential oppression and targeting by the establishment;
- The shrinking of space for Civil Society Organisations in general and the director's track record of challenging the establishment, might result in a certain scepticism and reluctance towards CDD by members of the government;
- Patriarchal and gerontocratic society where the youth are collectively seen as children and therefore subordinate to the adult. The youth are to be seen and not heard and listened to.
- COVID-19 and sudden reduction of funding by usual funders could affect Mozambique in the near future

Power and Stakeholder Analysis

There are numerous levels to the stakeholder environment for CDD programmes. The nature of the intended outcomes adds in a broader local, national, regional, continental and global scope of stakeholders. Whilst there are some agencies that can be identified individually, the majority fall into grouped categories;



From the above landscaping diagram, there are broad groups of stakeholders emerging that have been mapped according to influence and support to understand power dynamics and therefore strategies for engagement. It is worth noting that the utility of the below assessment is dynamic, and any changes in the political and economic landscape will impact where support and influence lies at any given time. So, it is important to consider this assessment as a *fluid process* and one that is likely to change thereby requiring revision and monitoring over time.

Power map of stakeholders

The strategy for stakeholder engagement is based on where they are mapped from an influence and support perspective. This is an important assessment as program approaches based on the below mapping are likely to be constant despite the fluidity of the stakeholder landscape as mentioned above. CDD's approach to stakeholder engagement and power mapping is largely defined by this analysis and helps provide consistency of work across the local to global continuum.





Programmatic approach (Generating our Value Add)

A major development in our programme approach is the important role of **local and regional convening**, **influencing stakeholders** including, partners, CSOs, government, donors, citizens, and private sector players, among others. The concept of Value Addition is very important in terms of CDD's preparedness and capability to play the influencing and convening role effectively. ***We recognise our strength in this area and this is the space where we expect to have concrete partnerships with allies in Mozambique and beyond. Consequently, our program approach will focus on the following***;

- **Invest in strengthening and organising civil society and citizens' engagement:** As a leading civil society organization, we will play the role of a facilitator and catalyst for change by enabling citizens' movements and organized civil society all-over to have their own identity and lead their change. We will ensure that solutions and initiatives are driven by the people whose voices must be heard and who in the end will sustain the change beyond us as facilitators. We will therefore work to create the national and regional spaces and platforms, form alliances, provide solidarity, technical and financial support and working with our internal stakeholders at national, regional and sometimes even global levels.

- **Contributing to enhancing State capacity:** Ultimately, we see Mozambique in particular, and Africa in general as better served by the emergence of democratic developmental states and as such, we will work directly with the key state institutions that we will have identified as the drivers of change to ensure that their policies and programmes are people centred and are increasingly accountable and transparent to all stakeholders.

- **Research and influencing:** Since CDD wants to influence changes in policy and practice, our advocacy will be based on empirical evidence (research). We acknowledge that some of the issues CDD will tackle are complex and answers will not always be obvious-research can clarify what the real cause of a problem is, or how to address an issue to bring about the desired changes. CDD will partner academic institutions (preferably from the global south), think tanks, governments agencies, youth groups, coalitions in order to carry out research. We will ensure the ability to utilise these various influencing approaches for programme impact sits with our frontline staff (programme managers) as well as work to strengthen the capabilities of our partners and allies for influencing. We will promote a hands-on and on the job approach to capacity building for influencing and we will seek partnerships with external allies to provide core skills building and accompany staff and other actors through learning and skills development.

- **Innovation:** CDD will focus on ensuring increased reach to the public-especially young people, building citizens' base and support towards championing for pertinent issues in their society. Some of the advocacy tools include but are not limited to; (a) vibrant social media and web-based campaigning and information sharing (b) innovative mainstream media programmes, and contests (c) high-tech phone applications, identifying target population and necessary information to be shared in the platforms.

- **Knowledge Generation:** If anyone will listen to CDD, we need to be bringing strong thought leadership and solutions to the table. Therefore, our research capacity needs to be well developed to ensure that we produce high quality knowledge products and advice on development policy and practice. This will start with the ability to invest in good research, being uncompromising in assessing research findings for quality, and being able to analyse and package the results in widely usable formats. We will seek

to partner with academic institutions, research institutions, movements, regional economic communities etc

- **Building Movements:** Building the capacities of citizens and other actors to engage with power holders is an act of empowerment for the people we seek to serve, but also a very powerful tool to deliver on our programme goals. We will be deliberate and focus on building active citizens, networks, movements and empowering them to deliver messages and influence. While CDD is fast developing a brand that opens doors, we acknowledge the existence of other powerful players who can open more doors for us and we will seek to work with and equip such individuals with information and messages for influencing.
- **Agility:** In our context, we are presented with a lot of opportunities through which we could influence and deliver change for the poor. We will endeavour to be agile and mobilise ourselves to engage sagaciously when such opportunities arise. We will develop a system and ways of working with technical support teams that provides for such flexibility and agility.
- **Security:** CDD works in a context of shrinking civil society space so security for our staff, partners will be of critical importance. We will define our internal security agenda and work with others at national and even regional level (Southern Africa Human Rights Defenders Network) to outline a strategy that focuses on the protection and security of our staff and other human rights defenders.

Partnerships

CDD views partnerships as mutually empowering relationships, which are aware of power imbalances and focused on mutual growth, organizational development, institutional strengthening and above all, on achieving impact. We believe that programs implemented in partnership increase the collective knowledge, skills, reach and experience applied to an issue or challenge. Programs implemented in partnership are likely to be better at encouraging and enabling the real participation and investment of people living in poverty. Partnerships can be challenging, and we do make mistakes – but we strive to learn from these, in the hopes that our partnerships evolve and grow stronger.

CDD will work through a range of local, national, regional and international partners to pursue its vision of a more just and inclusive world. Partnerships may be developed bilaterally with other civil society or governmental organizations, regional bodies, multilateral or academic institutions, and consortiums of other sector actors. Partnership develop through referrals, invitation or application, and may take the form of financial resourcing, capacity building, joint advocacy, research or co-creation, and collaboration on a range of national or global initiatives. Below will be our guiding partnership principles.

CDD Partnership Principles

- *Mutual Accountability and Openness*

  CDD will seek to develop and ensure a robust accountability framework, evaluation, communication processes and accountability mechanisms. Furthermore, we will seek partnerships where there is full commitment and accountability to each other and to other stakeholders, including the final beneficiaries. The level and ways of disclosing information between the two partners and to the other stakeholders will need to be mutually agreed at the onset of the partnership.

- *Flexibility*

  CDD will work in a fluid environment

where the context can change significantly, quickly and surprisingly. Thus, there will be need for flexibility regarding objectives, approaches, activities, etc. Periodic reviews on the partnership and related activities need to be in place.

- *Complementarity of Purpose and Values*

  CDD will seek to work with partners who share our vision and who complement our advocacy and programmatic goals. We believe that diversity can help to respond to a variety of complex challenges and strengthen problem-solving, and so we will unite efforts with a range of local, national and international organisations. Effective partnership promotes shared ownership and responsibility at every level which increases reach and ultimately improves sustainability and impact.

Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Strategy

In the logic of Results-Based-Management (RBM), CDD is committed to integrate Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning in all areas of its project planning and management. CDD is convinced that planning for results essentially helps to improve focus, effectiveness and accountability from designing and conceptualising an idea until the very end, when its projects' and activities' results, i.e. overall impact are assessed.
This is why, right from the beginning, CDD developed a Theory of Change and Logical Framework, outlining the basic Key Performance Indicators by which it will seek to monitor and assess its projects' progress (activities, outputs) and results (outcomes) as shown above.
However, it needs to be pointed out that, while using the Logframe matrix and Theory of Change as a parting point, CDD will, especially as 2019 is defined as the inception phase, continuously reassess and adapt not only its goal and activities but as well the frameworks and methodologies itself. For 2019, the first 'pilot' year, CDD is determined to systematically document and analyse ongoing challenges, progress and lessons learnt, which ultimately will inform strategic decisions and methodological adaptations for the 2020-2024 period.
Nevertheless, the following principles outline how CDD aims to work towards a sound and effective MEL culture:

Adaptive Programming
As has been pointed out by M&E research, traditional M&E – based essentially on tracking cause and effect – does not work for programs seeking to address complex and political environments like Mozambique. The various stakeholders, interactions and unplanned elements mean that there is a need for multiple data collection and analysis methods to get insights into the different aspects of the work. In addition, and essentially, it is more reasonable to acknowledge the fact that in such contexts, a projects' activities will – to some extent – CONTRIBUTE to the intended and actual outcomes rather than claiming to be the principle source of impact. While acknowledging the importance of being able to assess the results of its endeavours, by choosing the adaptive programming approach, ADS aims to provide useful information about how its programs are operating, what contributions are being made to change, and the impact and relevance of this contribution.
Traditional M&E used to focus mainly on (quantitative) output and outcome indicators. However, more often than not, these indicators don't allow capturing the "whole picture". If social change (i.e. a human system) is at the heart of a program, it is at least as important to have a look at relationships, interactions and relational practice, i.e. how people, organisations and states relate to each other.

Digital Communication and Engagement Strategy
One important element will be CDD' Digital Communication and Engagement Strategy. Not only does it represent an innovative and interactive way to engage with the main target group (Youth) to work towards the objectives, but it also allows for a more real-time feedback and reality-based data collection for MEL purposes.

Messages, comments and interactions on CDD' social media (Facebook, twitter, etc.) channels or transmitted via other online tools, will provide valuable immediate feedback on and insight into CDD work's impact. By valuing qualitative data and focusing on elements of concepts such as social network analysis, discourse analysis, changes in social norms, political economy analysis and outcome harvesting/mapping, CDD seeks to be able to tell a more complete story of the change it contributed to.

Outcome Mapping / Harvesting (cf. Wilson-Grau & Britt, 2012)
Outcome Harvesting is a utilisation focused, highly participatory tool that enables evaluators, grant makers, and managers to identify, formulate, verify, and make sense of outcomes they have influenced when relationships of cause-effect are unknown. Unlike some evaluation methods, Outcome Harvesting does not measure progress towards predetermined outcomes or objectives, but rather collects evidence of what has been achieved, and works backward to determine whether and how the project or intervention contributed to the change.

M&E and LEARNING
In order for the programming to be indeed adaptive and for the ongoing data collection and feedback have a real purpose and impact, the reflection and learning part has to be an integrative part of project planning and implementation. Adaptive programming requires the whole team to regularly take a step back, review and analyse the collected data and, more essentially, take responsibility for the results in order to define what this means for ongoing work. It means that ADS team, based on an updated context analysis and ideally engaging stakeholders, will regularly (twice a year) take one-two days for reflection and honest assessment of its efforts.

Reporting
ADS is committed to accountability, especially towards those who should ultimately benefit from its endeavours. This means that it aims at not only producing regular reports required by donors but seeks to produce a yearly review in a special format presenting its achievements to a larger public. This way, CDD wants to ensure relevant communication and feedback opportunity to its beneficiaries and partner organizations.

Staff Performance Monitoring and Evaluation
Staff performance Monitoring and Evaluation will be based on the Monitoring by Objectives model, staff appraisal interviews will be held twice a year.

Funding and Fundraising

CDD is developing a funding plan that looks at both programmatic and institutional funding. This plan focuses on four income streams over a five-year programming period; Institutional donors, Corporates (where relevant), through Public fundraising avenues and Trading activities.
Funding Landscape
Mozambique is experiencing tight fiscal pressures due to the covid19 pandemic, rising public debt, cyclone Idai impacts, reduced bilateral support from traditional donors and a generally unstable macro-economic environment. This has drastically reduced household income; corporate budgets for social responsibility and available donor funds for which there is intense competition from the CSOs in Mozambique currently. To become sustainable, CDD will need to diversify its funding sources and employ a tactical yet conservative approach to fundraising. Against this background CDD undertook an analysis of the fundraising landscape in Mozambique including market research, desktop reviews and concluded that;

- There is a healthy fundraising environment for NGOs,
- In Mozambique Corporate Social Investment (CSI) is a rising phenomenon which could be an opportunity for CDD
- There is competition for funding

space in the country, with Mozambique recording large numbers of NGO's and INGO's-consequently, consortium approaches to funding will likely yield more results. This bodes well for CDD given its convening role for FMO and SAHRDN

- There is modest local philanthropy with new Trust / Foundation income becoming available;
- NGOs should decrease their risk by diversifying their income streams given how hard-hit traditional donors have been by covid19 and the public debt crisis that saw aid cuts to Mozambique

Institutional Fundraising (Traditional Western donors)

We have conducted a mapping of the local funding landscape and are confident that we can build on this stream as a major foundational source to be an increasing source of income for CDD. Infact, this has been the only source of funding for the start-up initiative (CDD). Yet it will still require a clear strategy and focused effort to access the funding available on this stream. CDD will engage donors solo and sometimes as part of a group of likeminded NGOs. Many traditional Western donors have local offices in Maputo, some regional in Johannesburg which makes it easy to make the case for country specific funding where CDD has less competition for the same funding pot. We will constantly update such donors of our activities, needs and plans as a way of involving them.

Public Fundraising (Face to Face, Events, online)

This is still a largely untested market for local NGOs-especially the face to face strategies. Yet historically, locals (especially faith-based organisations) have always supported causes dear to them at a community level so significant local fundraising for programming is not a new phenomenon in Mozambique. Consequently, CDD will explore the possibilities for local public and online fundraising for specific activities like establishment of youth hubs or elections related work where there is a groundswell of local support for initiatives. Arguably, Mozambique is a cause driven market– so finding a way to link givers to a cause that they believe is important would be key here as would be building CDD's brand presence and reputation as a credible organisation. Over our 5 year plan we grow this stream to be one of the sources of income.

Trading

At the core of this multiplicity of income streams being tested is an urgent sense on the part of CDD to diversify income streams from the dominant institutional funding approach given covid19 and the general economic instability in several funding capitals. Furthermore, CDD seeks to develop independent programming positions that are not beholden to one funder but a result of meticulous and grounded context analysis. It is in that context that we will also spend time understanding what is possible in this market through an assessment of the landscape, identifying and testing over time some possible products and services. This will also be linked to some of the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives that are possible in the country. A number of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) like Oxfam, World Vision, Save The Children generate a significant portion of their income from trading which underscores the viability of the stream -at least in the sector.

CONCLUSION

This Program Strategy is a founding roadmap document. While not articulating in depth all our initiatives, it captures the essence of where we are building from. It builds on lessons and good practice of existing emblematic projects and elsewhere, and experiments with different approaches that are relevant to current context. An Operational Plan, with detailed programme activities is being developed and a Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEL) framework is being developed as well for the whole programme strategy to ensure delivery for impact. CDD will develop a separate fundraising plan that outlines its resourcing and growth avenues in the next few years.

Already, CDD has recruited staff with expertise in its respective areas of focus, and partners with leading institutions, experts and agencies to bolster its own capacity to shape policy discourse and influence change. Paying focus to knowledge, we collate the best information and research about our focus and are investing in our Knowledge capacity in terms of publications, training, tools, courses, and ways of positioning CDD differently – turning information into knowledge and making sense of what we're seeing and communicating to the world.

CDD will implement this Strategy through and with existing organisations/partners and seek to build new initiatives where people and communities highlight gaps in mobilising for and achieving a more just, democratic and developmental country, region and world where power and resources are shared, everyone lives in dignity, and poverty and inequality are no more. This Strategy will be reviewed periodically to ensure that CDD continues to learn and grow from and deepen its development practice to maximise opportunities for shaping change.