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PLATAFORMA DE PAZ E SEGURANÇA DE CABO DELGÁDO



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WHILE SAMIM EXITS MOZAMBIQUE DUE TO LACK OF FUNDS

Filipe Nyusi is committed to indebting Mozambique to the European Union to finance the continued presence of Rwandan troops in Cabo Delgado.

- According to available information, President Filipe Nyusi of the Republic of Mozambique is reportedly committed to persuading the European Union, a key financier in the fight against terrorism, to provide a loan of 20 million Euros to the Mozambican government. This funding would support the ongoing operations of Rwandan troops, which have either commenced or are set to bolster their presence in Cabo Delgado through increased troop deployments.



Credits: Carta de Mocambique

The operation comes at a time when the Mission of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Mozambique is leaving Cabo Delgado precisely because of an alleged lack of funds to finance the operations of the regional bloc's troops.

Mozambique's indebtedness to the European Union is problematic on two fronts. The first dimension concerns the lack of transparency, as it is conducted away from public scrutiny, including that of the National Assembly.

The second dimension emerges from inquiries regarding the rationale behind permitting SAMIM to depart due to financial constraints while simultaneously seeking funding for the Rwandan troops. Moreover, there are concerns regarding whether it might be more prudent to allocate funds toward enhancing the capabilities of the Mozambican Defense and Security Forces. According to Defense Minister Cristóvão Chume, these forces will be tasked with operating in the areas formerly under SAMIM's jurisdiction.

Mozambique's government indebtedness is possible under the European Peace Facility (EPF). Within the scope of its operations in the Northern Operational Theater (NOT), the Kigali regime received €20 million financed by the EPF in 2023. Consequently, if the government's new €20 million request, unbeknownst to the AR, is granted, Paul Kagame's administration will have amassed a total of €40 million funded by the EPF.

However, the second disbursement is not assured and encounters even fiercer opposition than the first from certain members of the European Union. Primarily, the opposition arises from concerns held by some states that the funds allocated to aid the battle against violent extremism in the NOT may be redirected by the Kigali regime to finance the insurgency in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹

While a new disbursement by the EPF divides opinions among EU member states, generating uncertainties, it is estimated that the costs of

Rwanda's operations in the NOT could exceed \$100 million. A complex challenge for Nyusi's government, which, under agreements with its cooperation partners, faces restrictions on taking out new non-concessional loans to finance the fight against insurgency."

The Rwandan troops have been in Cabo Delgado since the first part of the first quarter of 2021, and at this moment they have a contingent of over 2500 men on the ground, which may increase or may have increased.

According to the publication "Africa Intelligence," Kigali has already dispatched troops to the Northern Operational Theater (NOT). In early April, it was reported that the Rwandan regime planned to send more troops to Cabo Delgado to secure the areas that were under SAMIM's jurisdiction, namely Macomia, Muidumbe, Nangade, and Mocímboa da Praia.

The information was disclosed by the Commander of International Cooperation of the Rwandan Defense Forces, Brigadier General Patrick Karuretwa. At that time, the South African portal "News24" reported that the European Union would finance the deployment of these troops.



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¹ <https://africanarguments.org/2024/04/europes-indifference-to-rwandas-atrocities-is-costing-congolese-lives/>

A growing presence of Rwanda in Cabo Delgado and the strengthening of relations at the end of Nyusi's term

The mobilization of funds to finance the Rwandan troops comes at a time when, following the deliberation of Luanda on August 17, 2023, and Lusaka on March 23, 2024, the SAMIM troops, which arrived in Cabo Delgado shortly after Rwanda, are supposed to leave Mozambique in July of this year, with the de-

mobilization of Botswana troops starting on April 5 and South Africa's on April 15.

At present, troops from six countries, namely Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, the Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia, remain in Cabo Delgado on the SADC side.

Two narratives justify SAMIM's withdrawal from Cabo Delgado.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Verónica Macamo, attributes the cessation of SAMIM's mission to a lack of funds, a narrative widely echoed by Filipe Nyusi. The Defense Minister emphasizes that SAMIM's mission concluded following an evaluation indicating it had fulfilled its purpose of bolstering the Mozambican Defense Forces in its campaign against terrorists. This included reclaiming control of regions heavily affected by terrorism in Macomia, Muidumbe, Nangade, and Mocímboa da Praia.

However, this appears contradictory as the regional bloc's mission ends. At the same time, the state requests funds to finance the entry of Rwandan troops to replace SAMIM and to perform the work previously carried out by SAMIM. This fuels suspicions that SAMIM's withdrawal is due to the tense atmosphere created in the Northern Operational Theater (NOT) between the two foreign forces, supposedly fueled by the government, particularly by the differential treatment given to the two.

According to available information, the government appears to have prioritized Rwanda over the regional force. Additionally, SAMIM's departure and the increased deployment of Rwandan troops in Cabo Delgado, financed by

the European Union, signify Rwanda's growing influence in the region and further solidify the relationship between Nyusi and Kigali. This dynamic is particularly noteworthy as Nyusi approaches the end of his term.

Therefore, the Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CDD) believes that Mozambique's indebtedness to the European Union is problematic on two fronts. Firstly, there's a lack of transparency, as the operation proceeds without public scrutiny, including oversight from the National Assembly.

The second concern stems from questioning the rationale behind permitting SAMIM to depart due to financial constraints while simultaneously seeking funds for the Rwandan troops. Given the uncertainty surrounding this decision, it's crucial to inquire about its underlying motivations. Wouldn't it be more pragmatic to invest in bolstering the capabilities of the Mozambican Defense Forces, which reportedly confront significant combat and logistical obstacles, such as food shortages, especially considering their mandate to operate in the regions previously overseen by SAMIM? Wouldn't it be more expedient to invest in sustaining SAMIM's presence, which had already adapted and was familiar with the situation?



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